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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the theory of organizational decision
making has been dominated by the concept of rationality.
The popularity enjoyed by operations research, systems
analysis, and decision theory did much to further this
school of thought. According to the model, a single deci-
sion maker, acting under a set of consistent goals and
preferences, identifies as many courses of action as
possible, weighs these alternatives in a cost-benefit
framework, and then selects the option that optimizes the
attainment of predetermined objectives. [Ref. 1, Ref. 2,
Ref. 3, Ref. 4, Ref. 5]
The theory of "rational man" acting in a decision
situation assumes 1) that a single decision maker is
involved, 2) that the consequences associated with each
alternative can be anticipated, and 3) that the decision
maker is well aware of his goals and able to develop a
preference scale to choose among alternatives. Although
such an approach can provide certain insights into the
decision making process, the practical use is restricted
to a small subset of decision situations, primarily ones
characterized by simplicity, stability, and certainty.
As Charles Lindblom has said about the rational approach:
It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of
information that men simply do not possess, and it
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is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the
time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem
is limited, as is always the case. [Ref. 6: p. 80]
Alternate approaches to organizational decision making
were presented as early as 1938 by Chester Barnard in his
book The Functions of the Executive . Herbert Simon, James
March, Richard Cyert, Charles Lindblom, and Graham Allison
all had a significant impact in providing an awareness to
the limitations of the rational model, while providing new
ideas contributing to the understanding of the decision
making process.
Simon, in Administrative Behavior
,
proposed the concept
of satisficing, emphasizing "bounded-rationality", where
decision makers aim to find satisfactory options rather
than concern themselves with search and selection of optimal
alternatives. [Ref. 2]
Lindblom in a Public Administration Review article,
Cyert and March in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm , and
Allison in an American Political Science Review article,
all approached the view of decisions as an output of
standard operating procedures found within an organization
—
in general, known as the organizational procedures or
process view. [Ref. 6, Ref. 7, Ref. 1] Allison also
recognized the importance of power and bargaining procedures
within the decision arena, and this framework was described
as the bureaucratic political view of decision making.
[Ref. 1]

Although the importance and relevance of these "non-
rational" models cannot be underestimated, there still
remained a great deal of organizational behavior which did
not fit well into any of these frameworks. In 197 2, Cohen,
March, and Olsen presented an article in Administrative
Science Quarterly entitled "The Garbage Can Model of Organ-
izational Choice". Building on the previously discussed
decision frameworks, the article presented a model attempt-
ing to represent some of this unexplained organizational
behavior. Specifically, the model addressed organizations
facing uncertainty and ambiguity, where goals were ill-
defined, decision methodology undeveloped, and decision
makers inconsistent in their attention to organizational
decisions and problems. The garbage can model, as discussed
in the article and in subsequent books, was associated
primarily with educational institutions. [Ref. 8, Ref. 9,
Ref. 10, and Ref. 11]
The potential application of this model to a broad base
of organizational types began to take form when a framework
for studying military decision making was sought during
this particular research endeavor. Although analysis of
decision making in combat has been entrenched in rationality,
astute military authors have conceded that much uncertainty
and ambiguity faces even the most proficient military
commanders. Writing in Masters of the Art of Command ,
Blumenson and Stokesbury introduce their study of great
10

military leaders through the years with the following sober-
ing viewpoint:
The skills of the soldier and the officer, of
the newest "military manager" of modern armies, are
not startlingly different from those of Sulla, the
most ancient in this collection. . . . all the forces
that he can command are still at the mercy of all the
forces he cannot command. [Ref. 12: p. 38]
Karl von Clausewitz , one of the greatest military phil-
osophers of all time, had a similar thought:
We thus see that the absolute, the so-called
theoretical, faculty finds nowhere a sure basis in
the calculations of the art of war. From the outset
there is a play of possibilities and probabilities,
of good luck and bad, which permeates every aspect
of war, great or small, and makes war, of all branches
of human activity, the most like a game of cards.
[Ref. 13: p. 80]
The garbage can's preconditions of ill-defined goals
tailed problematic preferences in the model), undeveloped
decision methodology (known as unclear technology) , and
inconsistent decision maker attention (described as fluid
participation) are well-documented in military history:
--Problematic Preferences : Field Marshal Rommel of
the German Army in World War II was noted for not carrying
any fixed plans into battle other than those necessary for
initial confrontation with the enemy, and tailoring his
tactics to meet the threat as it occurred, [Ref. 14];
—Unclear Technology: Observations have been made
that military organizations are "notorious in their penchant
for the strategy of the last war" [Ref. 15: p. x] , thereby




—Fluid Participation: Certainly battlefield casualties
and communication failures lead to conditions of inconsistent
attention to decision situations.
Therefore, a seemingly disparate philosophy and model of
decision making is, in fact, very representative of the
intricate circumstances faced by the military decision maker
in combat.
Investigation into other organizational settings provided
additional applications of this dynamic and flexible model.
In the foreign policy arena, the United States' entrance
into the Korean Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the
prelude to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, provided
evidence that a theory of decision making under ambiguity
was indeed relevant. Similar crises circumstances in the
business world, specifically the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil
and Refining Company scandal of 196 3 which rocked the New
York Stock Exchange, demonstrated further the far-reaching
potential of the garbage can model to provide insight into
numerous facets of organizational decision making.
The thrust of this research effort was to enhance the
garbage can model, specifically by modification of the
FORTRAN simulation presented in the original Cohen, March,
Olsen article, incorporating attention mechanisms like
triggering (Chapter III) and deadlines (Chapter IV) , as
well as studying the effect of dynamic system load changes




The premise for this approach was to begin with a
relatively simple model, and to build in an evolutionary
manner a more elaborate extension of this model to include
certain aspects of complex situations commonly found by
military, business, and political organizational systems.
The overriding aspiration was to achieve what James Miller
experienced in his study of information overload, presented
in Living Systems :
Begin a basic research, and your subject matter
ramifies in many directions. A large number of new
questions arise. Begin with a basic research and
ultimately practical applications commonly appear.
[Ref. 16: p. 195]
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II. THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL
A. VERBAL MODEL
1 . Overview
The garbage can model has been selected for study
and adaptation based on two observed characteristics of
organizational systems. First, critical decisions in any
type of organization, whether it be military, industrial,
or political, often are made during times of complexity,
instability, and ambiguity, the very environment the garbage
can models. Secondly, decisions within an organization are
not made in isolation. At any point in time, there are
numerous decision situations, decision makers, organiza-
tional problems, and potential solutions interacting in a
manner not thoroughly addressed in other models of decision
making. This intricate interaction causes the organiza-
tional system to be driven by problem and solution flows,
rather than by the decision process itself.
Although often associated with educational institu-
tions and "exotic" organizations [Ref. 17: p. 295, Ref. 9,
Ref. 10, Ref. 8, and Ref. 11], examination of business,
military, and political decision making testifies to the
relevance of this model to a broader range of organizations,





A brief overview of the original model and associated
simulation will provide the necessary framework for dis-
cussion of adaptations and modifications to the model
presented in this paper.
In the purest sense of the model , an organization
should exhibit three properties, considered preconditions
to the operation of garbage can-like decision processes.
One could argue convincingly, however, the model is robust
in describing organizations with only one or two of these
characteristics. The three attributes of an "organized
anarchy" are problematic preferences, where goals are
confused and obscure, or where they are defined but not
widely agreed upon; unclear technology, where trial and
error or creative decision processes become the basis for
choice due to consequences of prior organizational action;
and fluid participation, where decision makers are recog-
nized as having limited attention, time, and energy to
devote to specific issues, thereby causing discontinuities
and instabilities within decision situations.
The theory of the garbage can model focuses on two
primary attributes of the decision process: decision
maker attention, and flows and timing of decisions,
problems, and solution alternatives within an organization.
[Ref. 18, Ref. 11, and Ref. 19]
2 . Decision Maker Attention
Every organizational decision maker must answer
the questions: To what decisions should I apportion my
15

time and effort? When is the optimal time to work on
certain problems? How should I prioritize my activities?
Under ambiguous conditions, the answers to these questions
are not easily ascertained. Therefore, the decision maker
is faced with having to satisfice his decisions, based on
his limited ability to provide attention to choice situations.
The garbage can models attention distribution through organ-
izational structures, decision maker energy distributions,
and the time availability of decision situations, problems,
and alternatives. Further investigation into attention
mechanisms, as presented in this paper, provide further
insight into this concept.
3 . Flows and Timing
The more traditional theories of decision making
view the ordering of the process as follows: problems
emerge, a decision situation is created to address these
problems, and then alternatives are sought to solve the
problem. In the garbage can, decisions situations, pro-
blems, and alternatives all circulate, to a large extent,
independent of one another, although decision makers do
have the ability to bring problems and alternatives with
them to choice opportunities. This relative independence
permits problem alternatives to arrive at choice situations
prior to the problem itself, as well as problems and
alternatives seeking decision situations in which to enter.
The matching of solutions to problems, thereby solving
organizational difficulties is largely determined by
16

sequencing and timing, as decision processes' components
are introduced to the system.
4 . Key Definitions
Four expressions are central to the model: choice,
problem, solution, and participant. They deserve an
explanation as to their meaning and significance.
A choice situation provides the potential arena
for a decision to be made. The outcome of a choice situation
may, or may not, be a decision. Even if a decision is
produced, few or none of the attendant problems may be
resolved. A choice is characterized by its activation
time, the decision maker's eligibility and actual partici-
pation in the process, and the organizational problems and
potential solutions brought for consideration.
Problems are those issues, when properly resolved,
that normally improve the efficiency or effectiveness of
some segment of the organization. Disposing of the right
problems may lead to victory in combat, a competitive
advantage in business, or a peaceful compromise in inter-
national relations. Problems, in the garbage can model,
exist independent of choices, and depending on the struc-
tural limitations of the organization, have varying degrees
of free access into available choice situations. Problems
are characterized by the time they enter the organizational
system, the relative effort needed to resolve them, and
the available choice situations they may penetrate.
17

Solutions are decision alternatives with the poten-
tial, if properly matched, to dispose of problems. Solutions
are similar to problems in that they have a time dependent
flow through the organization, and have the opportunity to
influence multiple choice situations. In the garbage can,
solutions are not discovered or created in response to a
specific problem or choice situation. They are independent
of both, and how they flow into the system will be a prom-
inent factor as to how well problems are resolved.
The decision makers who provide the time, energy,
and attention within a choice situation are considered to
be the garbage can participants . They are characterized by
the force they apply toward decision making and problem
solution, and their ability to become involved, as defined
by the organizational circumstances, in a specific choice
situation. The model concerns itself less with the indivi-
dual characteristics of the participants, i.e., their
personality, background, perspective, and their aggregate
effect and interaction with the other organizational elements
Although the use of metaphors in describing organ-
izational phenomenon has been criticized for its imprecision
[Ref . 20] , viewing the decision process in an organized
anarchy as a garbage can has its merits. The cans of the
model represent the various choices available for the
disposition of refuse—the problems, solutions, and
participants. As the process progresses through time,
18

some garbage is moved from one receptacle to another, other
garbage is ejected, and the remaining garbage continues to
mix in the containers. The operation of the model, as




The FORTRAN simulation, as presented in the original
garbage can article [Ref. 10], functions based on the follow-
ing specifications:
1) A set of fixed parameters—A limited number of partici-
pants (10) , choices (10) , and problems (20) , are allowed to
enter the organizational sphere of influence. Twenty time
periods are provided for the interaction of the preceding
elements
.
2) Entrance requirements—The 10 participants remain in
the decision arena for all 20 time periods. Choices enter
the system one per time period for the initial 10 time
periods, and are deactivated when a choice is made (how a
choice is "made" will be described below) . Problems enter
the system two per time period for the initial 10 time
periods, and similarly disappear when solved (how problems
are "solved" also is discussed below) . Solutions are
modeled in the simulation, but for ease of execution, as
19

a solution coefficient, ranging between and 1, rather than
as a flow of specific solutions. This coefficient can vary
from time period to time period, or be fixed for the entire
process
.
3) Structural definitions—All organizations have rules
and procedures, written and unwritten, formal and informal,
providing control over decision maker involvement and the
ability of organizational issues to be addressed within a
specified choice situation. The garbage can models these
organizational restraints with the use of decision and
access structures.
The decision structure regulates the ability of deci-
sion makers to attend to available choices. Although
eligible to participate in a choice situation, as delineated
by the decision structure, this does not imply the decision
maker must become involved in that particular decision, only
an invitation is offered.
Three decision structures are simulated in the garbage
can: unsegmented, hierarchial, and specialized. The matrix
composition of each of these structures is represented in
each of the tables which follow, where the numeral one in
a particular position means the participant has access to
the associated choice, and a restriction is represented by
a zero. For discussion purposes, choices and participants
are ranked from most to least important, as the participant
and choice number increases from one to ten.
20

In the unsegmented decision structure, Table I, all
participants may access all choices. This could model the
top decision makers in an organization (for example , in the
military context, the Flag Commander, Chief of Staff, and







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A hierarchial structure, Table II, is the one most
commonly associated with bureaucratic organizations. Top
decision makers have access to many choices, whereas
decision makers down the organization have more limited
access. Again considering the military environment, this
could represent a commanding officer at the top of the
organizational pyramid having the potential to be involved
in numerous decision situations, whereas subordinates down







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1
9 1 1
10 1
The specialized structure, Table III, severely limits
the access of all participants. Decision makers only attend
to a choice falling in their own area of expertise. The
individual members of a military staff (Intelligence Officer,
Logistics Officer, Administrative Officer, etc.) would often
operate under this arrangement.
The relational possibilities for problems to choices
is exactly analagous. Termed access matrices, the simulation
provides for unsegmented, hierarchial, and specialized
access of problems to choices. As previously mentioned,
solutions conceptually could be organized in a similar
manner, but for simplification, are modeled as a single
coefficient.
The simulation results are heavily dependent on the


















under ambiguous conditions, these administrative practices
help to prevent "unexpected" participants or problems
arriving at choice situations—the structures, therefore,
begin to add some order to an otherwise anarchial state.
4) Energy factors—Energy in the simulation is associated
with participants and problems, reflecting the ongoing
competition between the decision maker's time, attention,
motivation, experience and abilities, and the activated
problems' complexity, novelty, and difficulty [Ref. 19].
Numerically, the participants are provided with 5.5
units of energy per time period. This energy may be distri-
buted in three different ways: the case where the most
important decision maker has the least energy to provide
per time period (.1) and the least important decision maker
has the most (1.0), with the intermediate decision makers
23

having increasing energy going from the top of the organiza-
tion down; the case where all ten decision makers have
equal energy per time period (.55); and the case where the
most important decision maker has the most energy per time
period (1.0) and the least important decision maker adds
little energy per time period (.1), with intermediate
decision makers having increasing energy going from bottom
to top.
To determine which distribution best models a given
organization, one would have to examine the boundaries of
analysis. When simulating a closed system embedded in an
open system, where top decision makers must devote a sig-
nificant amount of energy and attention outside the simulated
portion of the organization (for public relations, govern-
mental liaison, etc.), the first energy allocation scheme,
where the most important decision maker has less energy,
might be considered most appropriate.
When simulating a strictly closed system, where one
is only studying the internal interactions of an organiza-
tion (i.e., outside demands are ignored because they are
the same for all decision makers) it is perhaps most
appropriate considering the top decision maker with the
most energy, distribution scheme three. Although the
energy demand is great on the top leadership of the
organization in this situation, their experience and
knowledge is far-reaching, thus enabling them to make up
24

for a lack of attention, by the use of their developed
talents.
In the most general case, scheme two, equal energy
for all participants is fitting. One might view this con-
dition where the less important decision makers can add
raw energy to a decision situation by the time they can
devote, and the most important decision makers add the
refined energy of experienced judgment in short spurts of
attention to assist in bringing a decision to closure
[Ref. 21].
Problems bring energy requirements to choice situa-
tions as well, and it is this energy which must be overcome
in order for a choice to be made. Under a given load
condition (light, moderate, or heavy), each of the 20 problems
carry the same energy requirement— 1.1, 2.2, 3.3 respectively.
The original model does not allow for problems to become
more difficult within a 20 time period run. Modeling this
dynamic change was one of the modifications performed in
this study. Results of the modification will be presented
in a subsequent section.
5) Participant and problem assignments—Another critical
issue of the simulation is how problems and participants
flow to choice situations. Assuming a participant or
problem has the necessary credentials to enter a choice
situation (as determined by the decision and access matrices)
,
the final assignment (in a particular time period) will be
25

to that choice nearest completion. Problems and partici-
pants will therefore attend to decision situations with the
highest expected return [Ref . 11] . This method of assign-
ment highlights the importance of what else is happening in
the organizational system when a participant decides where
to devote attention. In addition, each activated problem
and participant must be attached to one choice per time
period, unless there are no choice situations to which they
have access.
6) Choice execution--Central to the simulation's operation
is the making of choices and the solution of problems. A
choice is made when the energy as derived from the energy
distribution and solution coefficients, accumulated over all
time periods, summed over all decision makers having attached
to the choice, is greater than or equal to the total energy
solution requirement of the problems presently at the choice.
This calculation is performed for every active choice, every
time period.
Problems are solved only when they are attached to a
consummated choice. This is termed decision by resolution.
Organizations would prefer all choices to be made in this
manner. In the garbage can, however, choices also may be
made by flight or oversight, and simulation results show
these to be the primary methods of decision making, especially
under moderate or heavy loads.
Oversight decision making is done quickly and efficiently
on certain choices as they enter the system, without regard to
26

any associated organizational problems. In the simulation,
this occurs when participants move to a choice situation,
but for various reasons no problems attach to the choice.
One time period worth of participant's energy will be
sufficient to make the choice.
Decisions by flight occur when problems have been
attached to a choice for some time, preventing the comple-
tion of the choice, but subsequently all move into other
decision situations allowing the remaining participants to
make the choice—again solving no problems.
2 . Results and Implications
The simulation is exercised by having the six afore-
mentioned elements (fixed parameters, entrance requirements,
structural definitions, energy factors, participant and
problem assignments, and choice execution) interact, permit-
ting observations to be made and conclusions to be drawn
about system decision making in an organization facing an
environment where the three preconditions of the model hold
true. The simulation runs through 81 different organiza-
tional combinations: three types of loads (light, medium,
heavy) , three types of decision structures (unsegmented,
hierarchial, specialized), three types of access structures
(unsegmented, hierarchial, specialized), and three types of





A number of implications about garbage can-like
decision processes were drawn from the statistical results
emanating from the original simulation runs [Ref . 8] . Four
of these observations will be highlighted as being signifi-
cant in their relationship to modifications investigated in
this study.
1) Few choices are not made, but most problems go un-
solved. Considering the 81 organizational variants, the
mean number of choices not made was 1.0 (out of 10), whereas
the rrean number of problems not solved was 12.3 (out of 20).
The principal reason for this is the majority of choices
are made by flight or oversight, solving no attached problems
Most choices can be made only when they first enter without
having problems attached, or subsequently when unburdened
as problems seek new choice situations. This result stands
in direct opposition to the normal theoretical view that
decision making is a process for solving problems. Further
discussion about studies in optimal structures for problem
solution is presented in the chapter entitled Dynamic Struc-
tural Change.
2) The load on the system has dramatic effects on the
decision makers' ability to achieve profitable results. In
general, as one looks across similar structures under light,
moderate, and heavy loads, choice resolution and problem
solution become much more difficult under moderate and heavy
loads. The chapter on load variations discusses the effects
28

on the system when load is not kept constant during the 20
time periods, but increases from a light to a heavy load,
an environment faced by military units in combat, and
business and political organizations in times of crisis.
3) Decision makers and problems have a repeated tendency
to migrate from choice to choice in mass when not restricted
by access or decision structures. This result tends to
explain why decision makers feel as if they are working on
the same problem time and time again. This mass migration
is discussed further in the chapter on Triggering.
4) Under hierarchial structures, where important and
unimportant choices can be differentiated, important choices
(choices one through five) normally are ineffective in
resolving problems, whereas unimportant choices (choices six
through ten) become a receptacle where problems have a better
chance of being solved. This is due to the fact that flight
and oversight are the primary means to make important choices
The chapter on Deadlines addresses how this situation can
be improved with administrative control mechanisms.
In Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations , March and
Olsen succinctly summarize the phenomena of decision making
under ambiguous conditions:
The garbage can process, as it has been observed,
is one in which problems, solutions, and participants
move from one choice opportunity to another in such a
way that the nature of the choice, the time it takes,
and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively
complicated intermeshing of the mix of choices avail-
able at any one time, the mix of problems that have
29

access to the organization, the mix of solutions
looking for problems, and the outside demand on the
decision makers. [Ref. 11: p. 36]
Although the process leads to an organizational situa-
tion whose actions and results are difficult to predict, and
whose decision makers have limited control over their deci-
sion making circumstances, the garbage can does allow
decisions to be made and some problems to be solved, even
when the organization confronts uncertainty and complexity.
For many organizations, like the military in combat and
businesses in crises, this model should provide insight





The first area investigated in the framework of the
garbage can model was the phenomenon of triggering. Although
described by varying names (stimuli, source mechanisms,
decision activations, interruptions), the concept of environ-
mental changes evoking decision situations is found in the
organizational writing of Barnard, Sayles, and Mintzberg
[Ref. 22, Ref. 23, Ref. 24], as well as in various political
science literature [Ref. 25, Ref. 27, Ref. 28]. Mintzberg's
study, in particular, highlighted the characteristic work
environment faced by the organizational decision maker. He
observed managers being constantly triggered by numerous and
diverse stimuli, resulting in limited attention to any one
matter, cursory examination of many problems, and the burden
of a heavy workload.
Triggering, therefore, will have a significant impact
as to which decision situations are created, and which
problems are attended to. As the garbage can model focuses
on attention, flows, and timing, the aggregate effect of
triggering should be observed in the simulation. The
extent to which this statement is true will be discussed
in the section on triggering simulation results.
It is instructive at this point to present a brief
overview of where triggers originate, how decision makers
31

respond to these triggers, and how this process affects
their decision making and overall approach to their respon-
sibilities .
1 . Sources of Triggers
Barnard claims in The Functions of the Executive
that occasions for decisions emanate from three sources:
superiors, subordinates, and the initiative of the indivi-
dual decision maker [Ref . 22] . In his study of administra-
tive behavior, Sayles parallels this thought with four more
general sources of stimuli: contacts initiated to the
manager, contacts initiated from the manager, observations
by the manager, and numerical records [Ref. 23]. Whatever
the sources—and they are many and varied—both inside and
outside the organization the decision maker faces an
inordinate number of daily contacts [Ref. 23].
One might imagine that the majority of these triggers
are precise and explicit, but in actuality, many are implicit
and ambiguous. A superior may use an implicit triggering
process to test the alertness or dedication of a subordinate,
or he may use this method to avoid a direct order. A strik-
ing example of the latter occurred in the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, when Moshe Dayan (Israeli Defense Minister) consistently
presented what was known as "ministerial advice" to his
commanders in the field. Although Dayan was to later
emphasize that these were not direct orders, they regularly
were construed as such, and the military commanders
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responded to the "advice" with meetings, radio contacts to
their subordinates, etc. [Ref. 29].
2 . Responses to Triggers
Perhaps more important than the source of trigger-
ing, is how decision makers respond to these triggers, and
the associated effects on their decision making process.
The response is well-described by Mintzberg, as he compares
the manager to a juggler:
At any one point in time he has a number of balls
in the air. Periodically, one comes down, receives a
short burst of energy, and goes up again. Meanwhile,
new balls wait on the sidelines and, at random inter-
vals, old balls are discarded and new ones added.
[Ref. 24: ?. 81]
Decision makers quickly and dutifully attend to triggers
coming from all directions. They are perfectly willing to
split their attention among numerous choice opportunities
rather than dedicating themselves for too long to one
situation.
The primary impact of this regimen is the emphasis
by decision makers on the immediate, the tangible, and the
urgent. This is often at the expense of the vital prior-
ities of the organization or the opportunity to use their
valuable time for planning and contemplation of critical
issues. There appears to be little attempt to differentiate
the frivolous from the meaningful.
Basically, the largely futile attempts at differen-
tiation are accomplished through what could be considered
the individual decision maker's "filtration system",
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characterized by the perceptions he or she brings to the
situation, a cursory examination of the information's
source, and the way the information entered the system
[Ref. 15, Ref. 28, Ref. 26].
An example of this process in action took place
prior to the Korean Crisis of 1950, when the United States
Ambassador to South Korea sent a cable to the State Depart-
ment about the heavy buildup of North Korean troops along
the 38th parallel. This information should have triggered
the executive branch into a decision situation, but because
of (1) the perception that the Soviet Union would not back
such an invasion into Korea, and (2) the source of the
information--a diplomat who was known to be building a
case for more military and economic aid to South Korea
—
the triggering did not occur until the invasion of South
Korea actually took place [Ref. 26]. Although this "system"
is in place, observation of organizational decision making
shows it to be largely ineffective in preventing decision
making by fragmentation.
3 . Control of Triggers
Is there evidence organizations and decision makers
make a concerted effort to control triggering and there-
fore add more consistency and regularity to their existence?
Organizations as a whole, attempt to control triggering by
the use of filtering devices like staffs, executive
assistants, and secretaries, as well as stressing formal
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lines of communication and time management techniques to
prevent interruptions. The relative failure of these control
mechanisms, however, can be attributed to the individual
decision maker's unwillingness to ignore the triggers which
govern his workday. Mintzberg found indicators that
decision makers actually prefer the type of hectic environ-
ment described previously, and feel uncomfortable when it
does not exist [Ref. 24: p. 34]. When triggering is
limited, the decision maker begins to search the environ-
ment actively, observing, inspecting, questioning associates,
subordinates, and key intelligence sources, internal or
external to the organization. Decision makers thrive on
this active flow of information, primarily in the form of
verbal media, i.e., face-to-face contacts, meetings, and
telephone calls [Ref. 30: p. 52].
4 . Examples of Triggering
Military, organizational, and foreign policy history
are replete with examples of triggering. In the foreign
policy arena, prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War three major
stimuli created choice situations for the Israeli Government:
(1) On 15 May 1967, Egyptian troops were moved through
Cairo on their way to the Suez; Prime Minister Eshkol
responded by meeting with the Chief of Staff of the
Israeli Defense Forces, and they decided to alert the
Regular Army. (2) On 22 May 1967, Egypt closed the Straits
of Tiran to shipping; the Israeli cabinet met and initiated
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a large scale mobilization. (3) On 30 May 1967, King
Hussein of Jordan arrived in Cairo and signed a defense
agreement with Nasser; Eshkol sent his intelligence head
to ascertain the position of the United States in this
situation, and subsequently the Israeli leadership solid-
ified their battle plans, leading to the 1967 war [Ref. 27]
Similar reactions to occuring events, creating
meetings, discussions, personal contacts, and eventual
decisions, can be seen in the business world as crises are
experienced. The 1963 Allied Crude Vegetable Oil and
Refining Company scandal is an example demonstrating how
the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange
was triggered into decision situations as the scandal
began to unfold [Ref. 31].
This same triggering behavior was visible in the
Korean Crisis of 1950, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
numerous decisive battles through time [Ref. 25, Ref. 32,
Ref. 33, Ref. 34, Ref. 35].
Triggering is a significant characteristic of any
organization, and a decision making model representing
any part of organizational reality must in some way
address this mechanism.
B. SIMULATION MODIFICATIONS
To determine whether the original garbage can simulation
realistically modeled triggering, as described in the
previous section, a detailed analysis was performed on the
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stream of choices entering the system one per time period
for the first ten periods, how decision makers responded
as these choices entered the system, and whether there was
evidence of fragmented attention to choice situations.
After completing this investigation, it became apparent
the original simulation performed enviably in representing
this triggering phenomenon. Since the garbage can model is
approaching decision making from a systems view, it did not
address who was doing the triggering, or how the triggers
were creating choice situations, only that there was a
constant input of new choice situations to which the
decision maker had the ability to attend. The specific
attributes of the original simulation in connection with
triggering will be presented in the following section.
One minor modification to the simulation was made, limit-
ing the number of consecutive time periods a participant
could work on a given choice to three time periods maximum.
The decision maker could return to the choice he was working
on, but was forced to divert his attention elsewhere, at
least temporarily. In the original model, a participant
conceivably could work all 20 time periods on the same
choice, if he had access, and the choice remained active
in the system. The research evidence presented earlier
indicates managers will not continue to work on the same
choice, but will either be interrupted or search for




1. The Original Model
Table IV and Table V provide an historical analysis
of participant attention distribution to choices as they
entered the system for the first ten time periods of simula-
tion under the three load conditions and two of the decisional
structures (unsegmented and hierarchial)
.
TABLE IV
UNSEGMENTED DECISION MAKER MOVEMENT*
Li.ght Mod Heavy
Time Entering Load Load Load
Period Choice
Number DM1 DM5 DM1 DM5 DM1 DM5
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 5 5 5 5 9 5 5
5 2 5 5 2 2 2 2
6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
*This table tracks the movement of decision makers 1 and 5
for the first ten time periods, under all three load con-
ditions. They are acting under an unsegmented decision
structure.
If eligible for a particular entering choice, decision makers
rarely prefer the choice they are presently working on (or
other choices in the system) to this newly activated choice.
Attention is, in fact, brief and fragmented to any one choice
It is interesting to note the decision maker's behavior is
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essentially invariant across load conditions. The partici-
pant's interest, regardless of load, is to attend to the
immediate vice the important (by definition, choice one is
the most important, and ten the least important) . Perhaps
this is why long range planning, which might be most impor-
tant to the organization is pushed aside as the telephone
rings, the subordinate knocks on the door, or the letter
demands a response. These results were consistent across
access structures, decision structures, and participant
energy distributions.
TABLE V
HIERARCHIAL DECISION MAKER MOVEMENT*
Light Mod Heavy
Time Entering Load Load Load
Period Choice
Number DM1 DM5 DM1 DM5 DM1 DM5










*This table tracks the movement of decision makers one and
five for the first ten time periods, under all three load
conditions. They are acting under a hierarchial decision
structure.
NOTE: means unattached, no choices are in the system
for which the participant is eligible.
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7 7 7 7 7 7
9 9 9 9 9 9
5 5 5 5 5 5
2 5 2 5 2 7
3 5 3 3 9
4 5 4 4 9
5 5 1 1 9
6 6 6 6 6 6
8 8 8 8 8 8

2 . Modification
Limiting the time a decision maker could remain with
a single choice situation had little effect on the overall
simulation results as shown in Table VI, except in certain
cases under moderate load (see Table VII)
.
TABLE VI

















*This table compares the mean choice failures (ten maximum)
and mean problem failures (20 maximum) for all three load











Organizational variants with significant degradation in
problem solution between original simulation and modifica-
tion under moderate load.
40

Under light load, problems are easy enough (1.1 units
of energy per problem) that participants can be diverted from
a choice they are dilligently working on, and still return
to make the choice and solve associated problems. Heavy load
decision making follows the same pattern in the modifica-
tion as with the original simulation—choices are hard to
make and most problems remain unsolved.
It is only under moderate load where some variation
occurred, and only with three combinations of structures.
In comparing the decision making histories, one can see why
there exists such a wide disparity in results for these
structures. Under the normal simulation conditions, each of
the structures at the bottom of Table VI make a single
unimportant choice in a very late time period, solving up
to 16 problems at once. This occurs because a large number
of decision makers and problems float to a single choice
about time period 11, allowing other choices in the arena
to be made by flight or oversight. This large migration
occurs because an unimportant choice can be accessed by
everyone under unsegmented structures, and by most problems
and participants under hierarchial. These decision makers
and problems then battle each other within this single
choice, for a number of time periods, with the partici-
pants finally accumulating enough energy to make the choice
and solve the problems, late in the game.
When the participants must break their attention,
as modeled in the modification, and are not allowed
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a consistent buildup of energy, they never attain the
required strength to overcome the problems.
D. IMPLICATIONS
1) Triggering has been shown, through field research
and historical analysis, to be a very real and important
part of organizational life. The garbage can simulation
operates in an arena where triggering and fragmentation
of decision maker time, energy, and attention are prominent
attributes affecting how decisions are made or not made.
This is a strong indication of the broad application
of garbage can-like decision making beyond educational
institutions and irregular organizations. In addition,
the model has demonstrated its potential to serve as a
foundation for further studies of triggering and its
effects
.
2) Since it is apparent that individual decision makers
do not have a strong desire to limit triggering, an organ-
ization, through its structural definitions, may artifi-
cially place restrictions on choice situations being created
for specific decision makers, or at least limit the influx
of problems to particular choices.
Under an unsegmented decision structure, for example,
participant five will normally attend immediately to any
entering choice, one through ten. When the decision struc-
ture is changed to hierarchial, participant five will still
attend to entering choices, but now only choices five
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through ten will divert his energy when they are activated.
When choice one through four enter, however, participant
five will not attach to these choices, thereby providing
the decision situation he is presently working on with
more concentrated effort.
3) Looking at the process of triggering from the vantage
point of the superior, subordinate, or outsider who caused
the trigger and forced the decision situation, they can be
confident that their interest is at least being studied,
even if only briefly, by eligible decision makers. The
garbage can indicates numerous issues can be approached,,
and at least under light and moderate load, decisions are
made on these issues, and some attendant problems are
being solved.
4) If triggering and associated participant reaction is
proceeding as expected, i.e., the organization is operat-
ing similar to the garbage can model, organizational
participants should be encouraged to limit their time at
any one choice. This idea is in direct opposition to the
concepts of time management, where interruptions and
diversions are to be avoided. If a cost is not associated
with moving from choice to choice, i.e., "start-up" costs
with a new choice or memory loss when returning to an old
choice, a decision maker can fragment his attention to
allow the broadest coverage of organizational issues,
without degrading system performance in decision making
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or problem solving. The exception to this is when a large
number of decision makers have been involved in a single
choice situation for some time, with the potential to resolve
a number of problems. Under those circumstances, it is
better to allow the group to continue to devote concentrated






Deadlines, as an organizational occurence, are not
discussed in the original garbage can article, but their
potential for existence under conditions of ambiguity is
broached in March and Olsen's Ambiguity and Choice in
Organizations [Ref. 11: p. 226]. Intuition tells us
even when goals are unclear, decision making technology
undefined, and decision maker participation inconsistent,
personal and organizational deadlines will still be present
and have an effect on attention allocation and decision
attainment.
In his analysis of Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower
during their terms of office in the White House, R. E.
Neustadt highlighted the importance of deadlines
:
A President's priorities are set not by the rela-
tive importance of a task, but by the relative necessity
for him to do it. He deals first with the things that
are required of him next. Deadlines rule his personal
agenda. [Ref. 36: p. 50]
Similar results were observed by Sune Carlson. His
studies of Swedish managing directors found them to be
driven by their personal appointment books; if someone
was interested in getting a director to attend to an
issue, the commitment had to be documented on their
calendar for a specific date and time. [Ref. 37: p. 71]
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1. Soft vs. Hard Deadlines
Progress report sumbissions and material shipment
in business, major military operations such as the Inchon
landing in the Korean War, and the budget process in the
government—all are associated with deadlines. Often these
deadlines prove to be "soft" in that the project continues
even though not completed by the supposed deadline. The
United States Congressional budget enactments of the last
few years are good examples of this situation. In other
circumstances, however, the organizational system is
unyielding in its demand for a resolution by a definite
date or time. For instance, if a certain product is not
shipped by an agreed upon date, a contractual penalty may
be imposed, or the contract lost. It is this second type
of deadline, the "hard" deadline, which will be studied
and simulated under a number of conditions.
2
.
Individual Response to Deadlines
In examining accounts of those who have faced and
observed deadline and crises situations, it becomes apparent
that individuals do not react in identical ways to these
time-pressured conditions. Observing the decision process
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert Kennedy concluded:
That kind of pressure does strange things to a
human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature,
experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics
and strengths that perhaps even they never knew they
had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming.
[Ref. 32: p. 44]
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General Abraham Adan, a Division Commander during
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, related similar experiences:
At times of crisis, particularly in wartime,
everyone is expected to outdo himself and exploit
his abilities to the full. Some break when the
responsibility is intolerably heavy. [Ref. 29: p. 453]
These and other accounts of reactions to deadlines
would indicate decision makers basically fall into one of
two categories when facing a deadline: those who thrive
on the challenge of a deadline, mobilizing extra energy
as a byproduct, and those who regress in their ability
to cope with the situation, seeing the deadline more as an
obstacle than a motivator.
3 . Added Energy to Deadlined Choices
Although both types of decision makers would exist
in any organization, the study of deadlines was simplified
by first concentrating on the circumstances where the
organizational system reacted in a positive way to dead-
lines, potentially providing additional energy to the
decision process. This additional energy increase to the
system is deemed possible in crisis situations for short
periods of time, as evidenced by all night meetings of key
executives or legislators, extended rescue work by fire-
fighters during a disaster, and military personnel engaged
in a battle spanning several consecutive days. Three models
were tested:
1) Deadlines on choice situations (forced attachment)
—
The system and/or its environment create a deadline on a
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specific choice situation, and all eligible participants,
as determined by the organizational structures, devote their
time, energy, and attention to this decision, remaining
with the choice until completed or deadlined without solution
This deadline draws participants to the choice due to some
type of penalty and reward associated with the choice out-
come, but the participants are not able to provide more than
their normal amount of energy or attention to the deadlined
choice. Deadlines commonly force decision makers away from
other commitments, enabling them to devote their full energy
to the task at hand [Ref. 11].
2) Deadline on choice situation (natural attachment)
—
Once again the system and/or environment create a deadline
on a specific choice situation, but this time, only those
participants coming to this decision opportunity by natural
occurence of events, i.e., through the flows and interaction
of decision makers, problems, solutions, and choices, remain
working on the choice. The system does not impose a require-
ment for participants to assist in the decision making
situation, but if a decision maker happens to wander in,
he or she stays at the choice, ignoring other decision
opportunities, out of obligation, organizational rules,
or peer pressure.
This type of deadline response will occur under
conditions of low organizational communications, where
participants do not learn about the deadline penalty
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or reward structure until they arrive at the choice oppor-
tunity.
3) Deadline on choice situation (additional participant
energy) —There is a deadline, but no associated continuous
attachment to that choice situation. Instead, any partici-
pant who works on the deadlined choice at any time is able
to provide more energy toward solution than he or she would
if it were just a normal decision situation. The attached
participants are, therefore, ones who benefit from the
challenge of a deadline.
4 . Secret Deadlines
Another set of deadline circumstances was examined,
and has been entitled "secret" deadlines. The deadlines
are "secret" in the sense they are totally unknown to the
organization, or at least unknown until their occurence,
and therefore do not provide for the effects modeled in the
previous section like added energy or forced participant
attention. Three types of secret deadlines were modeled:
1) Secret deadlines on choices—The organization is
faced with a deadline, but because of various reasons, (i.e.,
the deadline is assumed "soft" when in fact it is "hard",
or the decision makers have learned to react to deadlines
with caution since so many end up evaporating) no special
adaptations are made to assist the choice to completion.
The system is allowed to interact as normal, but if the
marked decision situation reaches its deadline, it disappears
without any future opportunity for solution.
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2) Secret deadlines on problems—This is a different look
at deadlines in that instead of choice situations having the
potential to evaporate without consummation, now problems
are the ones that disappear at a certain point in time.
Having problems leave the arena should help the overall
system in solving the remaining problems.
Do organizational problems really disappear like
this? They certainly do. Incorrectly analyzed data can
have decision makers thinking they have a problem, even
devote energy trying to solve it, only to find out over
time that the situation is not really a problem after all.
Deception in combat is a good example of this. A false
radar blip might have an air defense unit alerted, ready
for action, and find out only through time that their
supposed contact, or potential problem, has left the scope,
never to affect the unit again.
3) Secret deadlines on participants—This again is a
different twist to the subject of deadlines. In studying
a relatively closed organizational system, i.e., the
simulation of ten decision makers in an arena, the loss
of one participant has the potential to hurt the decision
making ability of the group significantly. This is the
ultimate case of fluid participation when decision makers
are not only moving from choice to choice, but actually
are leaving the arena. Mortalities and communication
failures in combat, i.e., deadlines on participants, lead
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to the extinction of certain energy, potentially available
for contribution by the affected participants. The move-
ment of qualified consultants and retiring executives out
of an organization presents similar energy loss problems
to the business world.
B. SIMULATION
An explanation of the six separate deadline simulation
modifications is presented below:
1) Deadline on choice situation (forced attachment)
—
During the initialization process of the simulation, a
random number generator is used to select one of the ten
choices to be deadlined. When that choice enters the
system, it is tagged to be ejected after four time periods
unless, of course, the choice can be made before the dead-
line.
The other event occurring when the deadlined choice
enters the system is that every eligible participant, as
determined by the current decision structure, is attached
to this choice. This attachment of participants remains
effective until the choice is consummated, or the deadline
occurs. At the point the choice disappears— for either of
the above two reasons—the participants and any attached
problems become eligible to move to other choices. Problems,




2) Deadline on choice situation (natural attachment)
—
The same initialization procedure is accomplished as in
the modification one, but when the deadlined choice enters,
no one is forced to this particular choice. If, however,
at any time a participant attaches to the deadlined choice,
that participant must remain there until the choice is
again either made or deadlined. Participant and problem
detachment is handled in the same manner as modification one
3) Deadline on choice situation (additional participant
energy) —Initial set-up is the same, but participants are
not forced at any time to attach to the deadlined choice.
When a participant does happen to enter the deadlined
choice, he is given .55 extra units of energy to provide
to that decision situation. (.55 equals one-tenth the
total energy available to all ten participants.) This
additional energy is only provided for participants working
on the deadline.
4) Secret deadline on choices—Once again, initial set-
up is the same as modification one, but in this case the
system is allowed to operate as it normally does, with the
exception if the selected choice is not made by the dead-
line, it is ejected from the system and counted as a choice
not made.
5) Secret deadline on problems—A problem is selected
at random to be deadlined four time periods after entrance.
If the problem remains unsolved at the point of deadline,
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the problem departs the arena, never to return. No special
considerations are made for this deadlined problem, and
other problems, choices, and participants are permitted to
interact as usual.
6) Secret deadline on participants—Participants are in
the decision arena from the very beginning, therefore the
random number generator selects both a participant to dead-
line, and a time period for him to leave the system. Again,
no special adjustments are made for the departure of the
deadlined participant. His potential for energy contribu-
tion is lost for the time periods remaining after his
departure.
C. RESULTS
1 . Secret Deadline on Participants
The most straightforward results were obtained from
putting a secret deadline on a single participant (modifica-
tion six) . The simulation was run twice with this modifica-
tion—decision maker three was deadlined in time period
eight in the first run, and decision maker seven was dead-
lined in time period 11 in the second run.
Deadlining participant three (a fairly important
decision maker) caused 17 of the 81 organizational variants
to degrade significantly as compared to the original simu-
lation. The other 64 variants remained relatively stable.
Nine of these 17 degraded structural combinations had an
energy distribution where the most important decision maker
53

had the most energy to provide the system. Degradation
occurred over all three load conditions and affected all
possible problem and decision access structures. The
unsegmented decision structure, however, was the least
affected. Only one of the 17 variants had this type of
decisional structure.
When decision maker seven was deadlined, fewer
organizational variants were affected, and only ten degraded.
The same basic results occurred, except five of the ten
degradations occurred with an energy distribution where the
less important decision makers had more energy. This makes
sense since decision maker seven is considered a less
important decision maker. Once again, the unsegmented
decision structure remained relatively stable through the
change.
2 . Secret Deadline on Problems
One would think taking a problem out of the arena
should improve overall system performance. This is generally,
but not always the case. One run was accomplished deadlining
problem one, another run deadlined problem three. The first
instance resulted in 70 organizational variants performing
relatively the same as the original simulation, eight variants
significantly improving, and three variants actually degrading
The deadline on problem three produced comparable results.
Degradation occurred only under hierarchial problem
access in combination with either specialized or hierarchial
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decision access. The disappearance of the deadlined problem
caused a rearrangement of subsequent problem flows to choices,
keeping important problems at important choices. In the
original simulation, these important problems fled to an
unimportant choice situation, later to be solved by resolu-
tion. In the modification, with the combination of a
group of important problems at an important choice and a
limited ability of decision makers to provide energy to
this choice, both choice and problem failures resulted.
3 . Secret Deadline on Choices
This modification was run once, deadlining choice
four. Sixteen of the 81 variants demonstrated decreased
performance relative to the original simulation. This
was due primarily to the situation in the original simula-
tion where choice four was made by resolution after time
period 11 (the deadline period in the modification) . Losing
a choice situation leads to the possibility of a more
intense buildup of problems on remaining choices in the
system. Because of this fact, the unsegmented decision
structure, with its inherent flexibility and reserve of
potential energy, did not experience any deterioration
when choice four was removed. In fact, under the secret
deadline condition, the combination of moderate load,
hierarchial access structure, and unsegmented decision
structure actually improved system performance. This was
the only variant which experienced an improvement. All of





Forced and Free Attachment to Deadlined Choice
The first observation about these two organizational
adaptations to deadlines is that they both achieve the same
results. Because of the triggering mechanism, discussed in
Chapter III, when a choice enters the system, eligible
participants inevitably turn their attention to this
decision situation. Therefore, whether the organization
forces decision makers to the deadlined choice or allows
the garbage can system to operate as normal, participants
will be attracted to this entering choice. The difference
between the original system interaction and these two
modifications is with the adaptation, when the partici-
pants attach, they do not leave the choice until it is made
or leaves the arena by deadline. This allows a concentrated
effort on the "marked" choice.
When a secret deadline is placed on choice four,
27 of the organizational variants experience choice four
being deadlined before it can be completed. If one of the
two attachment modifications is used on the entering dead-
lined choice, the choice failures on number four reduce
from 27 to ten. Because of the forced attachment, one
would surmise the aforementioned improvement would be at
the expense of overall system results, but this is not
the case. When the attachment modifications are compared to
the original simulation, little difference in performance
is noted, and when they are compared to the secret deadline
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modification, not only is the deadlined choice resolved
more often, but aggregate success is improved.
5. Adding Energy to Participants
Giving decision makers extra "motivation" energy
when participating in a deadlined choice situation has some
positive impact in making deadlined choices, but not as
much as the attachment modifications. Out of the 27 organ-
izational variants mentioned previously which were unable
to make choice four (the selected deadline choice) by the
required time, adding energy to participants decreased
this failure rate to 19, whereas the attachment modifica-
tions reduced it to ten. The primary reason for this is
again connected to triggering. Unless forced to remain at
a choice, participants will tend to move on to other deci-
sion situations, therefore adding energy as a one time boost
to decision making does not have a substantial effect.
D. IMPLICATIONS
Deadlines have the potential for being an important
control mechanism in garbage can-like situations. Much
more investigation and simulation is needed in this area
before significant generalizations can be presented as to
how deadlines affect an organization under conditions of
ambiguity. The basic simulation provides the solid founda-
tion to examine deadlines, but because of the high degree
of interaction and interrelatedness of flows, computerized
data analysis is needed to maximize the results of investigation
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Keeping this in mind, four implications are presented based
on the simulation modification results obtained:
1) If an organization wants to improve the chances of a
specific choice being made, placing a deadline on it, and
adjusting decision maker behavior can provide for the
achievement of this intention. The modification forcing
decision makers to a deadlined choice demonstrated that
keeping decision makers working on a deadlined choice rather
than allowing them to react to every incoming decision
opportunity has great potential for resolving the choice
of interest, while not degrading overall system effective-
ness. Having motivated participants, contributing extra
energy to a deadlined choice, can help also; but if they
are not sheltered from the triggering phenomenon, this
impact will not be as substantial.
2) When participants and choices are disappearing from
the arena because of "secret" deadlines, and the organiza-
tion has not provided a procedure for special attention
allocation, the unsegmented decision structure allows for
retained stability. Because of the power of mass movement
with a high energy potential and the flexibility of access-
ing all choices in the arena, it naturally is able to adapt
to changing circumstances.
3) For the most part, organizations should rejoice over
the occurence of problems leaving the arena, but as high-
lighted by the secret deadline on problems modification,
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because of the garbage can interaction process, decision
makers must be aware how the system readjusts to this
event. The readjustment effort may result in unusual,
unanticipated, or pathological results.
4) When decision makers, for whatever reason, leave the
arena without replacement, the overall system is going to
be hurt. Since an organization does not know which partici-
pants might depart, the secret deadline on participants
modification shows it is helpful to have as even a distri-
bution of energy as possible among decision makers. This
can be accomplished through shared information, education
and training, and other methods to allow a common group of
decision makers to have the same potential for energy
contributions to a specific decision situation. Losing a
single decision maker, therefore, will not have the
devastating effect that would be experienced if, for
instance, the organization had an energy distribution
where the most important decision maker had the most
energy, and the number two man was lost, destroying a
significant future energy contribution potential.
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V. DYNAMIC SYSTEM LOAD CHANGE
A. DISCUSSION
The system load factor in the original garbage can
simulation is based on the energy required to solve prob-
lems entering the organization. Under light load, each of
the 20 problems requires 1.1 units of energy for solution.
Moderate load increases this factor to 2.2, and heavy load
to 3.3. Considering the fact that participants consistently
provide the system with a maximum of 5.5 units of problem
solving energy per time period (deflated by the solution
coefficient) , the slack available in the organization
decreases as the load increases. A particular load condi-
tion is kept constant for all 20 time periods, for all 81
organizational variants. This consistency of load would
be an accurate representation of reality when a short time
horizon was associated with the 20 periods. Expanding this
time horizon would necessitate a dynamic change in the
load, particularly if one were modeling military units
approaching the enemy in combat, or a business/political
organization facing a growing crisis.
An overall system load increase has historically been
associated primarily with the effect of information on
decision making and problem solving. The organizational
decisional system has been compared to a communications net
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with varying types of information entering the system, and
subsequently being stored, processed, and distributed [Ref.
28: p. 128]. Even under stable organizational circum-
stances, this net produces distortions and erroneous infor-
mation. A rapidly changing environment will create even
greater informational difficulties for the decision maker.
Karl von Clausewitz, military strategist, has identified
the information problem in times of complexity and uncer-
tainty for the military commander: "A great part of the
information in war is contradictory, a still greater part
is false, and by far the greatest part is somewhat doubtful."
[Ref. 13: p. 128]
Facing significant decisions, and attempting to solve
perplexing and time critical problems often leads to an
intense search for information [Ref. 15: p. 78]. For
example, President Kennedy continued, as the Cuban Missile
Crisis proceeded, to increase the number of low level
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, hoping to ascertain more
accurate and timely information on the Soviet missile sites
[Ref. 32]. This accelerated search for information can lead
to an information stress condition identified by Miller in
Living Systems , known as input excess or overload [Ref. 16].
This overload is occurring as decision makers are
inquiring of sources outside the formal lines of authority
(as suggested by Mintzberg [Ref. 24: p. 70]) and receiving
advice from "every specialized unit at every level of the
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hierarchy" [Ref. 15: p. 78]. This abundance of information
is difficult for the decision maker to process, and often
results in poor decisions or other operational inefficiencies
[Ref. 16: p. 159].
Miller presents two other varieties of information
stresses: noise in the system, and information input lack
or underload. A description provided by General Abraham
Adan of the Israeli Army's Southern Command Headquarters
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War vividly represents the
effect of noise:
The war room was jammed with staff officers and
visitors. The place was a mess; you could barely find
your own feet. Looking at the maps and listening to
transceivers, I tried to follow reports from our forces
along the front, but in vain. So deafening was the
noise in the room, and so distorted the sound from
the radio net that it was impossible to understand
anything. It was a frustrating and depressing situa-
tion. I could not help thinking that it had to be
impossible to work out any coherent plan amidst such
disorder. [Ref. 29: p. 95]
Confusion reigns supreme, and information, even if accurate
and beneficial, never seems to reach the appropriate
decision maker.
Limited information can, of course, also be harmful to
organizational effectiveness. A crisis-like situation,
coupled with little intelligence data, or possible alter-
natives, makes problems appear more difficult and deci-
sions addressing these problems nearly impossible to resolve.
Information (too much, too little/ or too noisy) is a
significant factor in establishing the existence of systems
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having an increase in load and growing problem difficulty.
It is, however, not the only factor. Relative load on a
system can increase due to time criticality, fatigue of the
decision makers, established plans falling into disarray, or
unexpected events occurring due to accidents , natural
disasters, or competitor actions. Although the reasons are
many and varied, the reality is one or a combination of
these factors leads to a condition where the load on a
system increases dramatically, making decisions and prob-
lems hard to bring to conclusion.
B. SIMULATION
The original simulation uses a 20x1 matrix, initiated at
the beginning of the program, to assign the energy require-
ment for all 20 problems. For example, if the energy load
for a particular run was moderate, the matrix would be filled
with 2.2, and in each of the 20 time periods, a problem's
energy requirements would be taken from this matrix to be
2.2.
The simulation was modified so the matrix was dynami-
cally changed at the outset of the first ten time periods
to represent an increase in load. Figure 5.1 graphically
depicts the change in problem energy requirements.
The simulation was then run through each of the possible
organizational variants, and results tabulated and presented
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This figure plots the problem energy requirements
over the first 14 time periods, as modeled by the
simulation modification.
Figure 5 . 1 Dynamic Load Increase
C. RESULTS
Table VIII summarizes the results, comparing the running
of the original simulation to the modified version with
dynamic load variation (choice, problem, and solution





ORIGINAL SIMULATION vs. DYNAMIC LOAD MODIFICATION*
Original
Mean # of Mean # of % Choices
Load Choice Failures Problem Failures by Resolution
Light .4 8.0 48
Moderate .96 10.5 36
Heavy 1.7 16.1 25
Modification
Mean # of Mean # of % Choices
Choice Failures Problem Failures by Resolution
1.7 14.9 33
*This table presents how the modification compared to the
original simulation (under all three load conditions) in
the areas of choice failures (out of ten maximum)
,
problem
failures (20 maximum), and % of choices made by resolution,
Varying the load in the manner presented in the last
section creates an overall result falling in between a
constant moderate load and a constant heavy load. This
is in spite of the fact the problem's energy requirements
are 3.6 for periods 11 through 20 for the modification,
compared to 3.3 for the original simulation under heavy load
The modification did not significantly affect the trig-
gering mechanism of participants attaching to incoming
choices (as described in Chapter III) , but it does affect
the attachment procedures for the time periods after choices
no longer enter (periods 11 through 20) . A different
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pattern of organizational movement of participants and
problems among choices is evident.
Another set of results was evaluated at the completion
of exercising the modification—the time period distribu-
tion of problem solution, comparing the modification to
the original simulation. The participants in the modified
version took advantage of the initial lighter load, in
periods one through five, and took care of 50 percent of
the eventual problems solved. This is compared to the
original simulation, where under light load the partici-
pants used periods one through five to solve 27 percent
of the eventual problem successes, under moderate load 20
percent, and under heavy load 24 percent. Periods six
through ten for the modification experienced only 2 percent
of eventual problem solutions
—
participants had a very
difficult time consummating problems during this intense
time of load increase. In comparison, the original simu-
lation used periods six through ten to solve 22 percent
(light load) , 11 percent (moderate load) , and 10 percent
(heavy load) of the eventual problem solutions.
One would conjecture that the results obtained with
this load increase modification are more representative
of aggregate system performance, when modeling a dynamic
crisis-like environment, than the outcome associated with
any one of the three static load conditions. The signifi-




1) The garbage can simulation has the flexibility to
incorporate the enhancement of a dynamic load variation.
Many variations of this change in load could be studied to
determine interaction specifics for organizations faced
with ambiguity and increasing problem difficulty.
2) An organization will make choices more consistently
and solve a greater number of problems if the load on the
organization is kept to a minimum, i.e., a light or moderate
load.
3) Since it is for all practical purposes impossible to
prevent load fluctuations, an organization can take some
steps to ease the trauma of dramatic increases in load
where problem difficulty becomes magnified:
a) Solve as many organizational problems as possible
before the load begins to increase rapidly. If there
is organizational slack available in early stages of
a crisis, use the slack to concentrate on any problems
in the arena at that particular time. This will
allow decision makers to ride out the load increase,
and then solve more problems as the load level
steadies out, even if this level is one where problem
difficulty is extremely high.
b) If additional participants can be added to the
system, providing extra attention and energy to deci-
sion making and problem solving, they should be
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injected into the system at the point where the load
is increasing rapidly. This is the time frame when
the system is having the most trouble bringing prob-
lems to solution. This will require the organization
to anticipate this imminent condition, and plan for
personnel selection and augmentation before the actual
occurence of dramatic increase in organizational
problem difficulty.
c) Different adjustment processes for information
overload are presented by Miller in Living Systems
[Ref. 16: p. 123]. Organizations faced with a
dynamic load increase can selectively choose a com-
bination of adjustments leading to a better control
over information. For instance, using filtering to
process only certain high priority messages or having
multiple channels to decrease the load on a single
decision maker may lead to more successful problem
solving. [Ref. 16: p. 159].
d) Flexible plans with multiple contingencies can
provide a more programmed response to unexpected
events, which normally would overload the system.
The distinct advantage of flexible planning is that
development of these plans can be done during times
of light load, when decision makers will have more
time and energy to devote to creativity and reflection
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4) There appears to be certain access and decisional
structures which are more stable under increasing load
conditions, or certain combinations of structures which
could be used dynamically in a changing environment. The




VI. DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL CHANGES
A. DISCUSSION
The dynamic load increase modeled in the last chapter
is an occurence every type of organization must face. How
an organization and its decision makers confront this
crisis situation may well determine their survival. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, flexible and well-
developed plans can contribute a great deal toward success-
ful organizational adaptation under these uncertain and
unpredictable conditions. von Clausewitz, commenting on
the subject of military planning, however, has rightly
identified the shortcomings of strategies and plans. His
thoughts hold true for any organizational system facing
the ambiguity of crisis
:
Strategy develops the plan of the war. ... it
plans the separate campaigns and arranges the engage-
ments to be fought in each of them. Since these are
matters which, to a great extent, can only be based
on assumptions, and some of these turn out to be
incorrect, while a number of other decisions pertain-
ing to details cannot be made beforehand at all, it
is evident that strategy must accompany the army to
the field in order to arrange particulars on the
spot, and to make the modifications in the general
plan which constantly becomes necessary. [Ref. 13:
p. 171]
As vital as plans may be, other organizational pro-
cedures must be used in conjunction with planning to adjust
to the increasing load experienced as a military unit goes
into combat, or an organization faces an escalating crisis.
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Changing organizational structure as a response to a tur-
bulent environment has been suggested by Lawrence and
Lorsch [Ref
. 38] ; Galbraith [Ref . 39] ; Hedberg, Nystrom,
and Starbuck [Ref. 40]; Allison [Ref. 1] ; and Sproull,
Weiner, and Wolf [Ref. 9 J. Allison has pointed out that
major crises, in fact, become an excellent opportunity
to enact dramatic organizational change [Ref. 1] . One
observation made of organizations making such a structural
change during a crisis is that decisional units tend to
be smaller, more participative, and less formal, at least
while the crisis is ongoing [Ref. 27, Ref. 28, Ref. 32].
The original garbage can simulation results hint
at the potential profitability in changing structures as
system load increases. Table IX lists the three organi-
zational variants which best made choices and solved
problems under the three load conditions, and for compari-
son shows the mean choices made and problems solved over
all variants for that particular load condition.
One notices that the same combinations are net found
consistently through all loads. Unsegmented-Unsegmented,
and Hierarchial-Hierarchial are front-runners under light
and moderate load, but are not even in the top three under
heavy load. What is especially interesting to note is the
emergence of the specialized access structure as a success-
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V MEAN over all variants
Y
*These structural combinations are averaged over all
three energy distributions.
The increasing load simulation modification, as presented
in the last chapter enables a study of whether structural
change can, in fact, improve organizational performance
in times of expanding ambiguity and complexity. For as
Cohen and March stated in Leadership and Ambiguity :
"Management" in an anarchy involves the substi-
tution of knowledge and subtle adjustment (emphasis
is the author's) for the explicit authoritative
control of bureaucracy. [Ref. 10: p. 39}
B. SIMULATION
The objective of the structural change simulation study
was determining the profitability of manipulating
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either the access or decision structure as the system load
increased. Would organizational performance be optimized
with fixed structures, i.e., keeping an unsegmented deci-
sion structure with an unsegmented access structure for all
20 time periods, or would the system benefit from fixing
one type of structure and transitioning the other, i.e.,
keeping an unsegmented decision structure, but transition-
ing from an unsegmented access to specialized access
structure as the load increased? This second method
presumably would take advantage of the differing perfor-
mance abilities of the various structures under the original
simulation's three load conditions.
Six different structural transitions were examined, as
summarized in Table X.
TABLE X
STRUCTURAL TRANSITIONS STUDIED
Fixed Structure Transition Structures
Unseg Access Unseg Decision to Hier Decision
Hier Access Hier Decision to Unseg Decision
Spec Access Spec Decision to Unseg Decision
Unseg Decision Unseg Access to Spec Access
Hier Decision Hier Access to Spec Access
Spec Decision Spec Access to Unseg Access
Each of the possible access structures were kept fixed,
and a change was made from one decision structure to another
(the methodology used for deciding which structures to
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transition is given below) . The same procedure was used
keeping each of the decision structures fixed and altering
the access structure. Only one structural change was
made per modification, and changing both access and
decision structures at the same time was not attempted.
For each modification study, the starting structural
combination was based on optimal results obtained under
light and moderate loads (in the original simulation)
,
and the transition structural combination was based on
successful results obtained under heavy load (again from
the original simulation) . Taking the unsegmented decision
structure as an illustrative example: under light and
moderate loads in the original simulation, this decision
structure, combined with an unsegmented access structure,
is able to solve more problems and make more choices
than the combination of unsegmented decision with hier-
archial access or specialized access. Under heavy load,
however, the best structure to combine with unsegmented
decision is a specialized access— so this was chosen as
the transition structure. Similar logic was used for the
other five modifications.
Experimentation was done on the time period of transi-
tion for each of the modifications to determine the optimal
interval to make the structural change.
C. RESULTS
The results imply there is, in fact, a structural
transition achieving superior system performance. The
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unsegmented decision structure, with a transition from an
unsegmented to a specialized access structure, outdoes
any other possible combination, fixed or transitioned,
when the system is facing an increasing load condition.
In fact, this modification achieved 80 percent of its
choices by resolution—a result unparalleled by any
organizational variant, even under light load with the
original simulation.
Table XI compares, by way of choices made and problems
solved, this unsegmented to specialized access transition
to the next best transition structure, to the three best
fixed structures under dynamic load, and to the mean




DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL CHANGE RESULTS
Access Str. Decision Str. Choices Problems
Made Solved
Unseg to Spec Unseg 10.0 14.0
Spec Spec to Unseg 9.7 11.7
Spec Unseg 10.0 11.0
Hier Unseg 9.0 9.0
Spec Hier 8.0 8.0
MEAN over all fixed variants 8.3 5.1
D. IMPLICATIONS
1) The simulation, through minor modification, is able
to represent the recommended and observed occurence of
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structural change in response to load variation. Further
research is possible with simultaneous variation in both
access and decision structures, multiple changes over the
20 periods, and the use of hybrid structures.
2) The superior results obtained by a specific combin-
ation of decision and access structures, transitioned over
time, supports the principle presented by Thompson and
Tuden in Leavitt and Pondy ' s Readings in Managerial Psycho -
logy , that "an important role for administration is to
manage the decision process, as distinct from making the
decision" [Ref. 41: p. 511]. When key leaders of an
organization are involved in decision making during crises
situations, they may be unable to control the actual
making of decisions, as problems, solutions, choices, and
participants flow throughout the system, but they have
the opportunity to manage the process through wise and
judicious selection of control and coordination mechanisms
This should provide hope for the key decision makers
facing ambiguous organizational circumstances.
3) The simulation results imply that the farsighted
organization will use an unsegmented decision and access
structure under lighter loads, and move to a specialized
access structure as load increases rapidly. The arrange-
ment under heavy load imposes structure on who can raise
problems within choice situations, but imposes little
structure on who can contribute energy for solution. The
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questions that follow this implication are: does this
organizational philosophy seem reasonable, and does this
type of transition actually occur?
An unsegmented decision structure represents the con-
cept of participative management, multiple organizational
actors all having access to the same choice situations.
The simultaneous movement of the Flag Officer, his Chief
of Staff, and his Operations Officer to decision situations
which they attend together, is representative, in the
military context, of this organizational structure.
Similar structure and movement can be found in special
task forces in the political environment, as well as in
business where corporations are using a strategy of
positioning more than one key person at the top of the
company to ease the burden on a single leading executive.
The principle of smaller decisional groups, acting partici-
patively in crisis situations, presented in the discussion
section of this chapter, would certainly be modeled by
the unsegmented decision structure.
The unsegmented access structure (optimal simulation
structure under light and moderate loads) allows problems
to have free access to all choice situations. Under
lighter loads, this seems very reasonable. If we imagine
a staff (military, political, or industrial) working
together under light load, they are apt to allow both
major and minor problems to enter decisional situations.
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The Fleet Admiral, for example, might be discussing minor
maintenance problems experienced by his flagship, as well
as considering possible enemy strengths, although an engage-
ment is not imminent.
When load increases, however, i.e., contact with the
enemy is made, problems must be restricted in their access
to decisional situations—the need for a gasket having
little bearing on the ability of the task force to engage
the enemy will be relegated to a very minor choice situation.
There will be a tendency to control problem entrance in a
manner that looks much like the specialized access, or at
least similar to hierarchial. Because of the continued
need for energy, attention, and expertise to be devoted to
choices, the decision structure should remain unsegmented
through the increase in load.
There are some disadvantages with this dynamic process
and the associated structures. First, having an unseg-
mented decision structure is expensive. Having a well-
trained and experienced flag staff costs both time and
money, and the same holds true for job sharing at the top
of the business organization.
Secondly, Mintzberg found that managers are reluctant
to delegate—a technique vital to the success of manage-
ment by participation. This reluctance is due primarily
to their attraction to the verbal media and the subsequent
storage of this information in their minds, rather than on
paper for the whole organization to use [Ref. 30].
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Third, many organizational leaders are not enamored
by the concept of participative management, and there are,
in fact, real dangers inherent in this type of decision
making in time of critical circumstances. As a military
author wrote : "A brainstorming group on the front line
might encounter difficulty, drizzling ideas under a rain
of shrapnel" (Ref. 14: p. 143].
Lastly, knowing when to change access structures is
critical to achieving satisfactory results. Key decision
makers, therefore, must be extremely sensitive to their
environment, sensing that time when load is increasing
rapidly, and there is a need for problem access restriction.
Even with these disadvantages, studying this approach
to decision making under uncertainty and dynamic load
increase can help leaders understand the process better, and
know when structural changes should be implemented, as





Two statements in the Cohen, March, and Olsen garbage
can model article place perspective on the importance of
the research presented in this paper:
It is clear that the garbage can process does
not resolve problems well. But it does enable
choices to be made and problems solved, even when
the organization is plagued with goal ambiguity and
conflict, with poorly understood problems that
wander in and out of the system, with a variable
environment, and with decision makers who may have
other things on their minds. [Ref. 8: p. 16]
. . . organized anarchies require a revised theory
of management. Significant parts of contemporary
theories of management introduce mechanisms for con-
trol and coordination which assume the existence of
well-defined goals and a well-defined technology,
as well as substantial participant involvement in
the affairs of the organization. Where goals and
technology are hazy, and participation is fluid,
many of the axioms and standard procedures of manage-
ment collapse. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
The first assertion acknowledges that a system operat-
ing according to the garbage can model is unlikely to
achieve optimal performance. Organizational decision
makers, though, should be encouraged by the fact that
the process does have the potential to make some deci-
sions, even good ones, and dispose of certain problems.
Better comprehension of this process by the organizational
participants should lead to enhanced system results.
The second statement implies that the study, develop-
ment, and use of the proper managerial tools under
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problematic conditions also can help improve organiza-
tional effectiveness.
This research contributes to the understanding of
organizational systems as they attempt to operate in an
uncertain and ambiguous environment. Triggering and
dynamic load increases were studied to determine their
effect on the garbage can process, and deadlines and
structural changes in choice access were presented as a
partial response to the need for managerial control and
coordination
.
In each of the chapters addressing a simulation modifi-
cation, implications were presented and will not be repeated
here. There are, however, some overriding principles to
carry away from this research undertaking:
1) Load has a dramatic effect on system effectiveness;
it behooves the organizational decision makers to be
sensitive to their load condition, and react accordingly
—
either by using a reduced load for intense planning and
solving as many problems as possible, or making structural
adaptations to an increasing load condition.
2) Triggering is a process which significantly affects
the attention allocation pattern of participants. It is
not an inherently bad process, in fact, it permits a
diverse portfolio of issues to be addressed, and some may
even be resolved. The problem emerges when there are
certain critical choices that must be made, and the
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resulting fragmentation of decision maker time, energy,
and attention often prohibits the desired choice resolu-
tion. This is where structural design or deadline adapt-
ation can be used effectively to focus the organization
on the proper priorities.
3) Attempting to develop and implement new and uncon-
ventional control mechanisms for use in the garbage can
process may not be as fruitful as using established tools,
adapted to fit the unique characteristics of ambiguous
circumstances. In fact, organizational performance may
be improved most notably by just having the decision makers
better understand the process that is affecting their
ability to make decisions. As Mintzberg has said:
. . . the manager's effectiveness is significantly
influenced by his insight into his own work. His
performance depends on how well he understands and
responds to the pressures and dilemmas of his job.
Thus managers who can be introspective about their
work are likely to be effective at their jobs.
[Ref. 30: p. 60]
B. FUTURE RESEARCH
The simulation experimentation accomplished in this
study demonstrated the usefulness of the garbage can model
as a springboard for launching future research in a number
of areas critical to organizational decision making:
1) How does the flow of organizational information, in
which problems and solutions are embedded, affect the
interaction of the garbage can elements, and how, in turn,
does this ultimately affect decision effectiveness?
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2) What is the impact of competition in the scenario of
uncertainty, when the system opponent is operating under
similar circumstances?
3) Can a learning curve be associated with the decision
maker's ability to make choices and solve problems, even
under conditions of unclear goals and technology?
4) What is the effect of a mix of both programmed and
nonprogrammed decisions in the organizational system?
5) Besides deadlines and structural changes, what
management techniques can be used within the garbage can
process to direct attention and achieve substantial solu-
tion of organizational problems?
In any case, simulation trials should be supplemented
by field research and case analysis, where studies of the
actual operation of the garbage can process in a cross-
section of organizations is compared to the behavior
predicted by the enriched model.
There exists a continuing need to study organizational
systems as they face the uncertainty of the future, whether
this organization be a military unit engaging enemy forces
in combat, a business entity confronting a precarious
economy, or a government challenged by an international
crisis. The garbage can model of organizational choice
offers a valuable framework for this understanding, pro-
viding the potential payback of improved understanding of
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